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Abstract This paper investigates entry decisions in industries where firms follow
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) behaviours. Provided that the market is
sufficiently large, the key result is that the adoption of CSR rules acts, loosely
speaking, as an entry barrier in the industry because the incumbent imposes a
‘‘penalisation’’ on the potential entrant’s profits which is more harmful the larger the
social concern is. As regards social welfare, two interesting results appear. For
relatively high fixed costs, a welfare reducing entry may happen; however, low
levels of the social concern may reduce the likelihood of a welfare reducing entry, in
line with the belief that CSR is pro-consumers. On the other hand, in sharp contrast
with this belief, for a sufficiently high level of social concern, entry is deterred when
duopoly is welfare improving: taking care about consumers’ welfare by firm brings
upon a damage for consumers.
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The widely observed adoption of firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR)
behaviours has recently, and more frequently raised the debate among scholars (e.g.
(Baron 2001, 2009; Benabou and Tirole 2010; Goering 2007, 2008; Jensen 2001;
Lambertini and Tampieri 2010). Actually, according to KPMG (2011, 2013), CSR
behaviours are undeniably a prevailing global business practice: in 2013, 71 % of
4100 companies surveyed in 41 countries have reported the realisation of CSR
activities. This figure represents an increase of 7 % points since 2011, when 64 % of
the companies surveyed issued CRS reports.
The conventional wisdom as regards the welfare effects of the introduction of
CSR rules in the firms’ behaviour argues that, in general, increasing social concern
or responsibility of the firms is necessarily welfare improving. For example, this is
the view prevailing in the European Union and between most scholars1.
In this paper we show that this conventional wisdom does not necessarily hold
true, since the effects of adopting CSR behaviours on social welfare may be also
dependent upon the long run effects of such adoption on the market structure and
the shape of competition.
In particular, provided that the market size is adequately large, entry can be more
easily deterred by the existence of social concerns in the industry, and the higher the
social concern the less likely is the entry. On the other hand, when the social
concern is relatively high and the consumers and social welfare would be higher
under duopoly, then such a choice, by impeding entry, results to be welfare
damaging, despite it aims to protect the consumers’ interests. These results are in
contrast to the conventional wisdom.
Therefore, these findings may be important for the current policy debate on firms’
social concern and of particular interest for antitrust and competition policies.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the monopoly
and duopoly models with CSR rules and the analysis discusses the issue of entry in
this context. The last section concludes our findings.
2 The model
We begin developing the monopoly model. The inverse demand function is:
p ¼ a q ð1Þ
where p and q denote the price and the quantity of the goods produced, respectively.
To focus on the effects of the adoption of CSR rules in this industry, we consider
that the firm’s marginal cost is zero. Given (1), the monopolist’s profit function is:
p ¼ ða qÞq: ð2Þ
1 For instance, the belief that social concern is welfare improving is evident in the content of the
European Union Commission’s Green Paper (European Commission 2001), ‘‘Promoting a European
framework for corporate social responsibility’’, and in Frank (2003) who argues that social concern
increases social welfare by enhancing the ‘‘common good’’
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Following the recent established literature (e.g. Goering 2007, 2008; Lambertini
and Tampieri 2010), we define the inclusion of a fraction of the market consumer
surplus k as the firm’s ‘‘social concern’’ or care for consumer outcomes in the
market. As a consequence, the CSR firm’s objective function may be specified as a
simple parameterized combination of profits and consumer surplus. Thus, the CSR
firm objective function (W) is:




where k 2 ½0; 1 denotes the weight that the CSR firm assigns to consumer surplus.2
The analysis is carried out usual through the maximisation of (3) with respect to
the quantity. The equilibrium output is:
qM ¼ a
2  k ð4Þ
where the upper script M stands for ‘‘monopoly’’. After substitution of (4) into (2),
the monopoly profits are
pM ¼ a
2ð1  kÞ
ð2  kÞ2 ð5Þ
with op
M
ok \0: an increase in the monopolist’s social concern decreases profitability.
Consider now the case of entry. We assume that the stakeholders participation in
governance applies on market decisions while the company strategy (such as the entry
decision) is beyond their scope. Put differently, we assume that the stakeholders exert
‘‘pressure’’ as regards the firm’s objective; however, the company’s strategic choices
are made by private owners. This hypothesis appears to be consistent with the empirical
study of Spitzeck and Hansen (2010), who find that the stakeholder engagement
mechanism is mainly restricted to ‘‘dialogue and issues’’ advisory. Moreover, in the
large majority of the companies included in their survey, the authors have found that
stakeholders have been consulted on managerial issues such as reporting, identification
of key performance indicators, risk management, spotting opportunities as well as
reputation management. Those subjects pertain to ‘‘the company’s current approach
towards relevant issues for stakeholders and do not involve any input on company
strategy or business development’’ (Spitzeck and Hansen 2010).
We define firm 1 as the incumbent and firm 2 the potential entrant. In duopoly,
the inverse market demand function becomes:
p ¼ a qi  qj ð6Þ
2 Goering (2007, 2008) attributes this objective function also to the Non-profit organizations (NPO)
which compete in commercial markets, for instance in sectors including University bookstores (Schiff
and Weisbrod 1991), water utility, rail track maintenance company, private air-traffic control organization
(Bennett et al. 2003) and even in the high-tech markets (Benz 2005). Therefore commercial NPOs selling
their output and services, which provide them revenue, may be considered CSR firms.
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where qi and qj are the firms’ output levels for i; j ¼ 1; 2 and i 6¼ j. The profit
functions are
p1 ¼ ða q1  q2Þq1 ð7Þ
p2 ¼ ða q1  q2Þq2  E ð8Þ
for the incumbent and the entrant, respectively. We assume, for simplicity, that both
incumbent and entrant follow the same CSR rules.3 Thus, the firms’ CSR objective
function (W) are:








for the incumbent and the entrant, respectively. The term E represents an exogenous
fixed cost the entrant faces.
Given (9) and (10), the firms’ maximization problem and the solution of the
FOCs’ system lead to the firms’ output decision:
qD ¼ a
3  2k ð11Þ
where the upper script D stands for ‘‘duopoly’’. Substituting (11) into the firms’
profit functions, we get the duopoly profits in equilibrium
pD ¼ a
2ð1  2kÞ
3  2kð Þ2  E ð12Þ
with op
D
ok \0. Let us briefly discuss the results. From (12), if E ¼ 0 (no entry costs)
the satisfaction of the non-negativity constraints on profits pD 0 requires that
k kmax ¼ 1
2
. However, if E[ 0 the potential entrant decides to enter if




 a2 þ 6E
E
\kmax: ð13Þ
That is, the firm’s interest for the consumer’s welfare has not to be too high. To





In fact, in the case of E[E, the fixed costs become excessively high for the
potential competitor because these imply that whatever positive value of k blocks
3 Although here exogenously given, note that this assumption is robust because it can be easily verified
that, in a SPNE, both duopoly firms select to adopt the same CSR rules (for an analysis of SPNE in a
duopoly without entry, see Fanti and Buccella (2015).
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entry. Therefore, CSR rules need a sufficiently large market to be adopted as an
entry barrier. Defining D ¼ pM  ðpD  EÞ ¼  a2ð9kþ2k37k25Þ
32kð Þ2ð2kÞ2  E, the following
Result holds.
Result 1: (1) If E[E, entry is blockaded; (2) if EE: (a) there is always a
value of the social concern kP 2 ðk; kmax that deters entry; and (b) if k 2 ½0; k, the
presence of social concerns may hamper entry; that is, the higher k the less likely
entry.
Proof Part (1) and (2) (a) directly derive from the above discussion. Part (2) (b)
straightforwardly follows from oDok [ 0.





, and shows that, for k ! 1
2
, the profit differential D increases
monotonically.
Intuitively, CSR rules tend to act, loosely speaking, as an entry barrier in the
industry, because their adoption decreases the entrant firm’s profitability. Therefore,
the incumbent may strategically follow CSR behaviours to inflict a profit
‘‘penalisation’’ to the potential entrant which is more damaging the larger the
social concern is.4
Fig. 1 Graphical representation of Result 1 for a ¼ 1 and E ¼ 1
10
















Let us discuss the welfare effects of entry. The social welfare under monopoly is
given by SWM ¼ pM þ CS, while under duopoly is SWD ¼ pD1 þ pD2 þ CS E;
therefore, the social welfare differential between monopoly and duopoly is
DSW ¼ SWM  SWD. Simple algebra shows that DSW [\ 0 if E [\ E ¼
4k210kþ5
2ð2kÞ2ð32kÞ2. From (5) it is immediately derived that for E[E
M ¼ 1kð2kÞ2, pM\0
and no firms are active in the market. Result 1 directly reveals that for EM E[E,
entry is blockaded and monopoly is the industry structure. From (12) it is obtained
that E E[ED ¼ 12kð32kÞ2, and the incumbent may deter entry. However, if
ED[EE, entry occurs, the market structure moves from monopoly to duopoly
but social welfare under monopoly is higher than under duopoly, i.e. a welfare
reducing entry takes place. On the other hand, if E[EE, entry is deterred and
this guarantees a welfare outcome superior to duopoly. Finally, for E[E 0, the
social welfare under duopoly is higher than under monopoly; however, if
E[EED, that is provided that k C .29, the monopolist is able to prevent
entry implying a social welfare damage (Fig. 2).
When the market structure is endogenous, an element commonly perceived to
have a positive impact on social welfare such as consumers’ care (the social
concern) may turn out to be, when sufficiently high, welfare detrimental.




This paper has investigated entry decisions in industries where firms follow
corporate social responsibility (CSR) behaviours.
The key result is that, if the fixed costs are adequately low, which implies that the
market size has to be large enough, the incumbent may always deter entry adopting
CSR rules. The rationale for this result is that the incumbent imposes a
‘‘penalisation’’ on the potential entrant, i.e. it reduces its profits, which is more
detrimental the larger the social concern is. With regard to social welfare, two
interesting results arise: (1) for relatively high fixed costs, a welfare reducing entry
can take place; however, low levels of the social concern may reduce the possibility
of a welfare reducing entry, in line with the belief that CSR acts in favour of the
consumers; and (2) in contrast with this belief, for combinations of a sufficiently
high level of social concern and low fixed costs, the incumbent can deter entry when
duopoly is welfare improving: the monopolist’s care about consumers’ welfare
brings upon a damage for consumers.
These findings contribute to the increasing policy debate on firms’ social
concern, showing a so far not explored effect of such concerns on the long run
market structure and, consequently, on the overall social welfare. This has evident
implications for antitrust and competition policies.
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